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This paper studies the Japanese credit scoring market using data on 2,000 SMEs and 
a small business credit scoring model widely used in the market. After constructing a 
model for determining a bank’s profit maximization, we find the optimum loan sizes 
and profit levels, and point out some lending pitfalls based on small business credit 
scoring. We show that solving the problems of adverse selection and window dressing 
are the most important things to do to increase the profitability of SBCS lending. In 




Key words: small business credit scoring, adverse selection, window dressing 







This paper is the product of research in the Study Group on Financial and Inter-firm Networks at 
RIETI. Permission to use RIETI’s TSR data and Moody’s KMV RiskCalc are gratefully 
acknowledged. The authors thank workshop participants at RIETI, Hosei University, Keio University, 
and Japan Center for Economic Research, Mitsuhiro Fukao, Naoyuki Yoshino, Tsutomu Watanabe, 
Arito Ono, Wako Watanabe, and Iichiro Uesugi for helpful comments. The authors are supported by 
a research grant from the Institute for Sustainability Research and Education, Hosei University. 
RIETI Discussion Papers Series aims at widely disseminating research results in the form of professional papers, 
thereby stimulating lively discussion. The views expressed in the papers are solely those of the author(s), and do not 
present those of the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry. 1 Introduction
Small business credit scoring (SBCS) has been widely used in Japanese SME￿ s
fundraising since the 2000s. Mega banks and regional banks started using
SBCS in 2002￿ 2003. Mega banks accumulated 5 trillion yen of SBCS loans,
about 5% of their loan outstanding to small businesses, by the end of 2005.
Regional banks made more than 8 trillion yen of SBCS loans, also about 5%
of their loan outstanding to small businesses, by the end of 2006.1 Moreover,
Japan Finance Corporation, the government-a¢ liated ￿nancial institution,
has provided a Securitization Support Program since 2004. The Program
securitizes SME loans, including SBCS loans with regional banks. The new
public loan guarantee system that began in 2006 uses SBCS to compute its
guarantee fees.
Support for the rapid increase in SBCS use includes development of SME
databases, the FSA￿ s regulatory encouragement, and the introduction of
Basel II reserve rules. First, SBCS came into practical use in the early 2000s
because advances in information technology made it possible to create the
large SME databases essential in building these models. Second, the FSA
has since 2003 been encouraging adoption of lending technologies that do
not require borrowers to pledge collateral.2 Third, the Basel II rules requir-
ing relatively high capital reserve ratios for SMEs have led banks to develop
technology for quantitatively measuring credit risks of SMEs (see Altman
and Sabato, 2005, 2007).
Even though we have no recent public statistics regarding the levels of
outstanding SBCS loans, all commercial banks have tended to decrease the
volume of outstanding SBCS loans over the last few years. That was triggered
by the huge SBCS loan losses of many banks using the SBCS technology.
The typical case is the losses incurred by the Shinginko (= "new bank", in
Japanese) Bank Tokyo established by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government
in 2005. Shinginko Bank Tokyo lost nearly 80% of its capital by the end of
2007. Such huge losses are the result of the relatively high default rates and
1Data are reported by the FSA and the Nikkei Newspaper.
2This is called the "Action Program to Promote Further Enhancement of Region-based
Relationship Banking Functions".
2low pro￿tability of SBCS loans.
Academic literature on SBCS focuses on how SBCS is applied and the
e⁄ect of SBCS on the volume of small business credit. Berger and Udell (2002,
2006) and Uchida, Udell, and Yamori (2007) examine the choice of lending
technology by banks. Frame, Srinivasan, and Woosley, (2001), Cowan and
Cowan (2006), and Ono (2005) show survey results about the use of SBCS
by ￿nancial institutions. Frame, Srinivasan, and Woosley, (2001), Frame,
Padhi, and Woosley (2004), Berger, Frame, and Miller (2005), Agarwal and
Hauswald (2008), and Berger, Cowan, and Frame (2009) ￿nd that SBCS can
enhance credit availability for SMEs. Berger, Frame, and Miller (2005) and
Agarwal and Hauswald (2008) discuss the prices of small business credits
made by banks using credit scoring.
Our objective is somewhat di⁄erent from that of the literature. This
paper evaluates the pro￿tability of SBCS loans in Japan. Discussion on the
pro￿tability of SBCS loans has been burgeoning. The Bank of Japan (2007)
suggests the particular importance of assessing the quality of the scores used
in the case of Japan￿ s SBCS lending.3 The Wall Street Journal (Maltby,
2010) says, "Even entrepreneurs with high business credit scores may have
trouble getting ￿nancing. This is partly because business credit scores as
well as personal credit scores have become a weak indicator of repayment
ability..." in the United States. Even though the discussion is lively, to the
best of our knowledge there is no empirical research on pro￿tability relative
to risks of default.4
This paper computes some quantitative pro￿tability measures for SBCS
lending by using a practically used scoring model and actual SMEs￿data.
We show (1) why SBCS loan losses arise, and (2) how ￿nancial institutions
can pro￿t from SBCS loans. In addition, this paper runs simulations of (3)
how Shinginko Tokyo made its huge losses from SBCS lending.
3Bank of Japan (2007) considers "the credit scoring models used by Japanese banks
are not su¢ ciently reliable and observed default rates at some banks exceed the default
rates projected by the models."
4This paper is also aimed at enhancing the secondary market for SBCS loans, as cur-
rently "no signi￿cant secondary market for small business credits has emerged" in the
United States (Berger and Frame, 2007) and that is also the case with Japan.
3It should be noted that this paper￿ s ￿rst priority is not the evaluation
of scoring models themselves but the evaluation of the pro￿tability of SBCS
loans. Therefore, we construct a simple pro￿t maximization problem of a
bank using the SBCS technology.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section II explains the SBCS
market in Japan and the data used in this paper. Section III describes the
model and the empirical results. Section IV shows our simulation results of
the Shinginko Bank￿ s lending policies. Section V concludes the paper.
2 Japanese SBCS and the Data Used
2.1 Japanese SBCS
Japanese SBCS is somewhat di⁄erent from that in the United States. Ac-
cording to Berger and Frame (2007) and many others, SBCS is a technology
for computing small business applicants￿propensity to repay their loans, and
is one of the most widely used lending technologies. SBCS models for com-
puting scores are constructed using econometric methods. Hard information
such as both quantitative and qualitative data are used for estimating the
default probability (= score) of loan borrowers. SBCS in Japan di⁄ers from
that in the US in regard to the use of consumer data on SME owners. Given
the incomplete combination of the consumer information and business infor-
mation databases, Japanese SBCS only uses business information in general.
There is a variety of Japanese SBCS models, and the one considered in
this paper is RiskCalc Ver. 1 developed by Moody￿ s KMV (the "RiskCalc").
The RiskCalc is created using pooled data on 41,577 SMEs between 1994
and 2000. Released in December 2001 by Moody￿ s KMV, it is one of the
most widely used ￿rst-generation credit scoring models for evaluating un-
listed companies￿creditworthiness in Japan. Typical SBCS models use latent
variable regression techniques and the RiskCalc employs probit regression.
The RiskCalc is also typical in regard to its independent and dependent
variables. Its independent variables comprise quantitative data about ￿rms￿
ordinary pro￿t/total assets, liabilities/total assets, cash/current assets, re-
4tained earnings/current liabilities, gross pro￿t/total interest expense, sales,
and total inventories/sales. They do not include any qualitative or consumer
data on SME owners. The dependent variable represents the default risk
(the "score") and would be "0" in the case of survival and "1" in the case of
default.
It should be noted that this paper focuses not on the absolute level of the
scores but rather on the relative level of the scores. When the RiskCalc was
created, the estimation sample data were mainly those of the late 1990s, a
time of weakening con￿dence in the Japanese ￿nancial system. This period
corresponds to the Heisei ￿nancial crisis, a time when Japanese credit markets
became keenly sensitive to credit risks for the ￿rst time (at least) since 1980.
In fact, the series of failures among ￿nancial institutions was accompanied
by a string of bankruptcies among general business ￿rms, including those
in 1997 of Tokai Kogyo, Tada Corporation, and Yaohan. The number of
bankruptcies among SMEs began to trend upwards from the late 1990s. In
this period, it was very di¢ cult to obtain information on overall default
rates of SMEs in Japan. According to Moody￿ s KMV, the average annual
default rate of the RiskCalc is assumed to be 1.2%. Judging from subsequent
actual overall default rates (1.5%), this level was somewhat optimistic. The
RiskCalc also estimates a "Dot PD rating" that maps the score to a rating.
This Dot PD rating cannot be directly compared to Moody￿ s long-term bond
rating, but as far as SMEs are concerned, the model assigns too high ratings
to them. As explained later, of 2000 SMEs there were 225 Aa rated ￿rms,
followed by A: 246 ￿rms, Baa: 465 ￿rms, Ba: 467 ￿rms, and B: 597 ￿rms.
Based on those facts, the level of long-term average default rates was initially
set too low compared with actual default rates, and then the absolute level
of default rates (the rating) may be a comparatively low value (resulting in
a higher rating).
2.2 Dataset
Our sample consists of SMEs in business for two consecutive years in 2001
and 2002. We see those companies as if they had applied to a bank for SBCS
5loans in the beginning of 2003, when the SBCS loans were introduced in
Japan.5 Firms in business in 2001 and 2002 were sampled from the database
of Tokyo Shoko Research (TSR). TSR, one of Japan￿ s oldest major credit
reporting and information provision companies, regularly collects corporate
data nationwide. We can ￿nd an adequate number of Japanese typical SMEs
in the TSR database.
The analysis focuses on a total of two thousand incorporated but unlisted
SMEs in three industries, including 496 in manufacturing, 504 in wholesale,
and 1,000 in construction. Sample companies were chosen in the following
way. First, for each industry, we sample the companies (1) in business in
2001 and 2002 and (2) whose survival or default information at the end of
2005 is available. In other words, the loan period is assumed to be three
years and the defaulting (or surviving) companies were companies that did
(or did not) default within three years after the loans were made. Second, we
choose the industries with a su¢ cient number of defaulting companies￿data
as well as those industries conforming to the RiskCalc.6 Third, out of the
two thousand companies, the numbers of surviving companies and default-
ing companies were equal in 2005. For example, 500 defaulting (surviving)
SMEs in construction were chosen from all defaulting (surviving) companies
in construction by random sampling from the TSR database. In short, the
number of surviving companies in each industry equals the number of de-
faulting companies. This was done for two reasons. The ￿rst reason was to
avoid problems that might otherwise arise if sampling were made in a sim-
ple fashion, possibly resulting in the defaulting companies being too few in
number. The second reason was that we can change the default rate of loan
5A ￿rm is assumed to submit the latest ￿nancial statements to a ￿nancial institution.
6There are some di⁄erences between the de￿nitions of "default" used in the TSR Data
and by the RiskCalc. The TSR Data de￿nes default as being subject to the application
of the Corporation Reorganization Law, taking procedures under the Civil Rehabilitation
Law, application for bankruptcy, application for special liquidation, suspension of trans-
actions with banks, internal (voluntary) liquidation, and the like. The RiskCalc de￿nes a
borrower as being in default when it has been in arrears for ninety days, when it ￿les for
bankruptcy, when it is classi￿ed by the lending ￿nancial institution as being in danger of
bankruptcy or when the borrower￿ s loan is written o⁄ by the lender. Since it is impossible
to make them completely consistent, de￿nitions of default are assumed to be the same for
the sake of convenience.
6applicants, as explained later.
2.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 shows the distribution of the scores and the medians of the princi-
pal ￿nancial ratios for two thousand companies in the TSR database. The
score (the default rate) seems to function as a better signal of default than
these individual indicators. A comparison of the median scores of surviving
companies and those of defaulting companies shows a signi￿cant di⁄erence.
An interesting point is the fact that default rates do not necessarily decline
as company size increases, and that default rates decline as pro￿tability or
￿nancial viability increases. If one looks at companies in wholesale and con-
struction in terms of sales, the defaulting companies tend to be the larger
ones. When companies are compared in terms of ￿nancial ratios used as indi-
cators of pro￿tability (operating margin) or ￿nancial viability (capital asset
ratio), on the other hand, there is a wide gap between surviving companies
and defaulting companies.
3 SBCS Loans and Bank Pro￿tability
In this section, we construct a simple pro￿t maximization model of SBCS
lending a la Hasumi and Hirata (2010) to evaluate empirically the pro￿tabil-
ity of the SBCS lending business.
3.1 Pro￿t Maximization of Scoring Lending
Suppose that a risk-neutral bank uses a SBCS technology. If a borrower
survives and repays, the bank earns r yen. If a borrower defaults and does
not repay, the bank loses l(> r) yen. The procedure for scoring lending is as
follows: the bank ranks the loan applicants by their scores and lends to the
applicants with the top z% scores. The amount of each loan is assumed to
be the same across borrowers and the bank can change the level of z from 0
7to 100. When the bank chooses z%, the pro￿t ￿(z) is:
￿(z) = rNA(z) ￿ lND(z) (1)
where NA(z) and ND(z) are the numbers of surviving and defaulting bor-
rowers, respectively. The pro￿t-maximizing bank chooses z% to maximize
its ￿(z). Suppose that NA(z) is di⁄erentiable with respect to z and the total
number of loan applicants is NM, which means NA(z)+ND(z) = NM ￿0:01z,













In addition, suppose that ￿0(z) is monotonically decreasing z satisfying the









3.2 Empirical Models and the Assumptions
We next transform the theoretical model into the empirical model. We quan-
titatively compute ￿(z) for any z, as we know the survive/default information
for all sample SMEs. We de￿ne ￿(zM) as the maximized ￿(z) at z = zM.
This zM is the measure of the availability of small business credit by using
the SBCS technology. There are N SMEs seeking credit (= loan applicants )
and SD +SA = N, where SD and SA are the number of defaulting SMEs and
that of surviving SMEs. Let nA(n) be the number of surviving borrowers in
the top n borrowers in terms of scores. We have










where z indicates what percentage of SMEs can borrow in the case that n out
of N loan applicants borrow, given the default rate PD. We give the default
rate of loan applicants PD exogenously, as no banks know that number.
An increase in this number can be considered as the degree of the adverse
8selection problem.










(n ￿ nA(n)) (6)
and thus:





(N ￿ SA) = 1 ￿ PD : PD (7)
Now the pro￿t function ￿n is
￿n = rnA(n) ￿ lnD(n) (8)
By plugging equation (5) into equation (8), the bank has its objective func-












































then ￿n goes down.
Some parameters and data are calibrated for the benchmark simulation.
First, the bank is assumed to order the loan applicants by the scores com-
puted by the RiskCalc. Second, based on analysis of the Japanese SBCS
loans surveyed by RIETI (2009), we assume that the terms of the contract
are three years and that the contracted annual interest rates on SBCS loans
are 2.7% (assuming simple interest just for simplicity). Second, the three-
9year default rate of loan applicants PD is assumed to be 5% based on the
Small Enterprise Default Ratio (i.e., default rates of SMEs) by the Risk Data
Bank of Japan. In this case, the adverse selection problem (discussed later)
does not exist, as the default rate for loan applicants is assumed to be the
same as the default rate for overall SMEs. Third, the recovery ratio is set
at zero for simplicity. Fourth, the amount of each loan is assumed to be the
same across borrowers. Fifth, ￿xed costs of developing the SBCS technology
and other costs, such as interest rates on deposit and labor costs, are assumed
to be zero.7
In sum, we set PD = 0:05, r = 100
SA , and l = 100
2:7￿3r. r is set to normalize
the maximized value of ￿n, rSA at 100 in the case that the SBCS technology
completely discriminates between surviving / defaulting ￿rms. l = 100
2:7￿3r is
computed from the fact that l=r = (loss when a SME defaults)=(pro￿t when




(k = 1;2;:::;K) (11)
where n0 = 0 < n1 < ￿￿￿ < nK = N, is computed as the approximation of
dnA=dn. sk indicates the portion of surviving SMEs that exists in the kth
bin, when the loan applicants are sorted by the scores and divided into K
bins.
3.3 Empirical Results
The bold solid line in Figure 1 shows the relationship between z and ￿n.
The bar graph represents the relationship between zk and sk. The entire
sample of SMEs is divided into 20 (=K) bins. zk is equal to k=K ￿100. The
horizontal dotted line is the threshold, i.e., a bar is lower (higher) than the
horizontal dotted line, and ￿n decreases (increases). The downward-sloping
bar graph implies that the share of defaulting SMEs increases as the ranking
7In this case, pro￿t ￿n corresponds to gross margin. Note that the interest rates on
deposits were close to zero in 2003￿ 2005 (interests on checking accounts: 0.001%, interests
on three-year saving accounts: 0.05%) given the Japan￿ s quantitatively easing monetary
policy.
10score goes down.
The kinked line in the upper left shows ￿n in the perfect case. It increases
from the origin to (z, ￿n)=(95,100) linearly and decreases to (100, ￿n(=35.2))
linearly. Note that the SBCS can evaluate the true PDs of the loan applicants
and the SBCS can order them in order of default if the model is perfect.
As the model is not perfect in reality, the bold solid line is located below
the straight kinked line of the perfect case. The shaded area between the
bold solid line and the kinked line displays the ine¢ ciency of SBCS loans.
The larger the shaded area is, the more ine¢ cient (= less pro￿table) SBCS
lending is. Table 2 reports the maximized ￿n and the corresponding values
including the ine¢ ciency for each industry.
There are various points worth mentioning. First, pro￿t is maximized in
the neighborhood of z = 75 for the three industries. In other words, without
the adverse problem, the bank using the SBCS technology can maximize
its pro￿t by lending to 75% of the loan applicants. If the bank lends more
(z > 75), the pro￿t becomes smaller.
Second, SBCS lending is relatively pro￿table compared with more infor-
mationally rich "relationship lending". "Relationship lending" uses not only
hard information but also soft information to solve the information opacity
problem of SMEs. As a proxy for the credit decisions of a relationship lend-
ing bank, we have the TSR ratings ranging from 0 to 100.8 The standards
of the TSR ratings are identical across TSR￿ s o¢ cers￿ratings of ￿rms and
they should do in-person interviews with the owners of each ￿rm to carry
out a subjective credit assessment.9 The same experiment as the benchmark
one is conducted for the TSR ratings and the results are shown in Figure
2. The maximized ￿(z) (= ￿(zM)) and the associated z (= zM) are (￿(zM),
8Given a lack of data availability, we only have data on the TSR ratings for 160 ￿rms,
116 surviving, and 44 defaulting ￿rms. The simulation is done by using those 160 ￿rms￿
data.
9According to the TSR, the score consists of four components: (i) management ability
(such as the business experience of the owner) and outstanding assets that can be collat-
eralized (20 points); (ii) the growth potential of sales and pro￿ts (25 points); (iii) stability
factors such as ￿rm age, the amount of capital outstanding, and the payment and credit
history of the ￿rm (45 points); and (iv) reputation and disclosure (10 points). The TSR
ratings are subjective in the sense that each TSR o¢ cer grades the ￿rms for which he or
she is responsible.
11zM)=(84.7, 60.5) if the scores are used and (￿(zM), zM)=(87.3, 63.2) if the
TSR ratings are used. Given the di⁄erences in the richness of the infor-
mation, we can say that the SBCS is quite a powerful tool for pro￿table
lending.
Third, SBCS ￿ts best for wholesale and ￿ts worst for construction, judg-
ing from ￿(zM), the ine¢ ciency, and zM. The pro￿t peak is the lowest and
the bar graph shows an unsmooth curve for construction, while the pro￿t
peak is the highest and the bar graph shows a smooth downward-sloping
curve for the wholesale industry.
4 The Pitfalls of SBCS Lending
To sum up, SBCS lending can be considered a pro￿table business to some
extent for those banks using the SBCS technology.10
We also ￿nd some pitfalls with SBCS lending. In this section, we try to
answer two questions to understand the sources of the pitfalls: ￿rst, what
causes the ine¢ ciency in the benchmark simulation; second, why large losses
were made in practice.
4.1 Causes of the Ine¢ ciency
In consideration of the empirical result in the previous section, various types
of factors cause the ine¢ ciency.
First, ine¢ ciency is, of course, what caused the accumulation of the loan
losses. The vertical di⁄erence between the bold solid line and the kinked
line in the pro￿t curve should widen with respect to z. Thus, the higher the
number of SMEs with higher scores go bankrupt, the greater the ine¢ ciency.
Figure 2 suggests that relationship lending is less ine¢ cient than SBCS
lending in the sense that the marginal changes in ￿n is smaller for relationship
lending than for SBCS lending in the range between z = 0 and z = 50 (or
smaller).
10We examined another commercial SBCS model for checking the sensitivity and all
results were very similar to those in this paper.
12Second, the SBCS models have an omitted variable bias. There are di¢ -
culties in predicting the future performance of an enterprise depending only
on its ￿nancial statements. In the case of the RiskCalc, only seven pieces of
hard data are used and any soft data are excluded as independent variables
that might in￿ uence the dependent variable. In fact, the ine¢ ciency is rel-
atively large in the case of construction, as this industry is heavily a⁄ected
by the amount of public works projects in Japan, and these are not covered
by the SBCS models.
Third, econometric methods applied to general SBCS models in the mar-
ket would be less sophisticated.11
Fourth, there is a di⁄erence between the distribution of independent vari-
ables in the estimation sample and the prediction sample. The di⁄erences in
the periods cause an extrapolation bias. Particularly, loans to SMEs are quite
sensitive to swings in business cycles and the bias cannot be negligible.12
Fifth, the transparency of ￿nancial statements of SMEs is doubtful in
Japan. According to the White Paper on Small and Medium Enterprises in
Japan in FY 2007, the Small Business Agency is trying to increase the num-
ber of ￿rms making quality ￿nancial statements, but only a limited number of
them can do so. Lack of high quality hard data makes the SBCS models less
accurate, and a low quality prediction sample worsens the scores. Note that
low quality can be caused not only by the (unintentional) lack of accounting
knowledge but also by (intentional) window dressing.
4.2 Simulating the Shinginko Bank￿ s Business Model
Many Japanese banks incurred huge SBCS loan losses in 2007￿ 2008, and
many of those banks, including Shinginko Bank Tokyo, often applied SBCS
to not current but new customers whose loan applications had been rejected
by other banks using relationship lending. Those losses cannot be explained
11As described, focusing on econometric issues with the SBCS technology is not this
paper￿ s primary objective. Please refer to Rommer (2005) and many other papers working
on the estimation issues of SBCS for further discussion.
12Since the RiskCalc was constructed using data for the period when credit risks were
rising, the scores might be rather conservative. Note that the latest SBCS technologies
used in Japan generally control for the business cycle factor.
13by the already mentioned causes of ine¢ ciency.
In this section, we examine the case of Shinginko Bank established by
Tokyo Metropolitan Government in 2005. Shinginko Bank￿ s main lending
technology was SBCS, but it was saddled with huge bad loans within three
years of opening. It was faced with the loss of nearly 80% of its capital by
the end of 2007 and was forced to increase its capital by 40 billion yen in
April, 2008.
Figure 3 illustrates the abstract of Shinginko Bank￿ s original business
model. The governor of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government said that
Shinginko Bank sought to provide ￿nancial intermediation services for in-
solvent SMEs, i.e., provide unsecured and uncollateralized loans for insol-
vent SMEs, which could not easily borrow from other banks. In reality, the
vast majority of the Shinginko Bank￿ s loan applicants were ￿rms rejected
by other banks, which generally did not use the SBCS technology but chose
relationship lending instead.
We mimic the Shinginko Bank￿ s business model and simulate that in the
following way. In the ￿rst stage, pro￿t-maximizing banks using relationship
lending make loan decisions. Some SMEs can borrow and the others cannot.
In the second stage, Shinginko Bank, using the SBCS technology, makes
loan decisions but all of its applicants are those rejected by banks using
relationship lending. For simulating the ￿rst stage, we assume banks using
relationship lending maximize their pro￿t.13 For simulating the second stage,
loans are assumed to be made uniformly by pro￿t-maximizing Shinginko
Bank and its interest rate on SBCS loans is assumed to be 7%. Although 7%
is much higher than 2:7% used in the benchmark experiment, that rate is the
average really applied by Shinginko Bank according to the ￿nancial press.
Figure 4 draws the pro￿t curve of the Shinginko simulation.14 It sug-
13We use both the TSR ratings and the scores computed by the non-Moody￿ s SBCS
model to mimic the ￿rst stage. Using the TSR ratings is more consistent with the theory
but the results do not show any signi￿cant di⁄erences. In Figure 4, the results using the
latter scores are displayed, as the TSR ratings are only available for 160 ￿rms and the
scores computed by the a non RiskCalc SBCS model are available for 2000 ￿rms. Note
that we were given access to the non RiskCalc model, one of the most popular SBCS
models in Japan, after signing a con￿dentially agreement.
14The ￿gure￿ s horizontal axis is normalized, i.e., z takes 100 in the case that Shinginko
14gests that the Shinginko Bank￿ s business model is surprisingly pro￿table and
the result contradicts the fact that it is relatively less pro￿table than the
benchmark experiment.15 Judging from this simulation result, good borrow-
ers remain even after the ￿rst stage and the SBCS technology with higher
interest rates can work even in the second stage.
What produces such a puzzling result? One possible hypothesis is that the
adverse selection and window-dressing problems take place simultaneously,
and those problems undermine the performance of SBCS loans. In this sim-
ulation, the default rate of loan applicants PD is assumed to be 5% in three
years. This number, however, is not predetermined and not known when
loans are made. This level of PD is just the average default rate of Japanese
SMEs, and this simulation implicitly assumes that almost no adverse selec-
tion happens. In addition, the data used in this simulation are randomly
sampled and the number of window-dressing SMEs might be limited.
We can simulate the impact of adverse selection by increasing the value
of PD. The value of PD is changed from the benchmark simulation. Figure
5 shows (￿(zM), zM) with respect to PD. When PD rises, maximum pro￿t
signi￿cantly decreases and the credit availability for SMEs also substantially
decreases. The SBCS models themselves seem to be weak against the adverse
selection problem and Shinginko Bank su⁄ered from this problem.
Finding any evidence of window dressing only from its ￿nancial state-
ments is di¢ cult, and we explore the possibility of window dressing in a
casual manner. We compute the debt ratios, the ratios of total liabilities at
the time when ￿rms became bankrupt to those in 2002, i.e., the time when
loans were made. We also compute the sales ratios, the ratios of sales at the
time when ￿rms became bankrupt to those in 2002. Those two ratios are
compared with the analogue ratios for surviving ￿rms.16 The results suggest
that the medians of the debt ratios and the sales ratios are almost unity
across industries but the distribution of the debt ratios of defaulting ￿rms
Bank lends to all of the applicants rejected by banks using relationship lending.
15If 2.7% is applied, the Shinginko Bank￿ s business model is not pro￿table and makes
large losses.
16For surviving ￿rms, we compute the ratios of total liabilities or sales at the time when
loans were repaid (in 2005) to those at the time when loans were made (in 2002).
15has a thicker right tail than that of surviving ￿rms. At the 90% percentile,
the sales ratios of the defaulting ￿rms and of the surviving ￿rms are 1.48 and
1.54, while the debt ratios of the defaulting ￿rms and of the surviving ￿rms
are 2.50 and 1.65, respectively. In particular, the debt ratio of the defaulting
construction ￿rms exceeds 3.0 at the 90% percentile. Large changes in stock
data such as total liabilities might be a good signal of window dressing, be-
cause they are generally much less volatile than ￿ ow data.17 For a robustness
check, Table 3 shows the Spearman￿ s rank-order correlation coe¢ cients for
the scores￿ranking and the debt ratios￿ranking for the defaulting ￿rms. This
result indicates that the defaulting construction ￿rms with the higher scores
(lower default possibilities) tend to increase their debt more signi￿cantly than
the surviving ￿rms do, suggesting the possibility of window dressing.
5 Conclusions
This paper studies the Japanese credit scoring market using data on 2,000
SMEs in business between 2001 and 2002. After constructing a model for a
bank￿ s pro￿t maximization, we ￿nd the optimum loan sizes and pro￿t levels,
and demonstrate some pitfalls of SBCS lending.
Now we can answer the questions raised in the Introduction. The ￿rst
question is why SBCS loan losses occur, and the most important answers are
the combination of adverse selection problem and window-dressing problems.
This paper quantitatively shows that, given the presence of adverse selection,
it is di¢ cult to make pro￿ts from SBCS lending. This paper also con￿rms
quantitatively that about half of the companies that defaulted despite having
a high score (= low default probability) defaulted following a sharp increase
in liabilities. There tends to be many such problems in the construction
industry. These ￿ndings are consistent with those of the Bank of Japan
(2007). In addition, needless to say, statistically re￿ning the SBCS models to
reduce the omitted variable bias and making SMEs increase the transparency
17Of course, a ￿rm close to bankruptcy tends to borrow more to survive. However, we
focus on not a gradual increase but a jump in total liabilities to determine the (intentional)
window-dressing cases.
16of ￿nancial statements are also important for reducing the ine¢ ciency.
The second question is how ￿nancial institutions could pro￿t from SBCS
lending. The ￿rst thing to do is to solve the adverse selection and the window-
dressing problems, although that would be costly. In so doing, greater stress
should be placed on interviews with management and on company visits, as
indicated by Ono (2005). Unfortunately, however, it would be too early to
assume that U.S. models could be readily applied in Japan, as only a limited
number of ￿nancial institutions are in a position that enables them to use
consumer data about the owners. For this reason, it seems reasonable that,
in most cases, lenders request prior interviews with company owners and
request personal guarantees from them.18 It is also important to identify
the idiosyncrasies of the model through a scrupulous analysis of track record
data to establish the telltale signs of window dressing.
Finally, several points in regard to this study should be mentioned. First,
￿xed costs and variable costs involved in credit scoring were not considered.
Second, the SBCS models are now in their second or third generation, but
these newer models have not been analyzed. Third, this paper did not ex-
plicitly consider the demand function of SBCS loans. Fourth, this paper￿ s
analysis is partial in the sense that it does not consider substitutes for credit
scoring. These issues are for future studies.
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19Figure 1. Profit Curves 
 
Three Industries  Manufacturing 
Wholesale Construction 
Notes: The bold solid line is the profit curve when the SBCS technology is used. The solid kinked 
line shows the profit curve when the examination of loans is perfect. The shaded area is the 
inefficiency. The bar graph represents the relationship between zk and sk. Profit decreases when a 
bar is lower than the horizontal dotted line. Figure 2. Comparison of Scoring and Relationship Lending 
 
Scoring Relationship-lending 
Note: See Figure 1. 
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 Figure 4. Simulation of the Business Model of Shinginko Bank Tokyo 
 
Notes: See Figure 1. This figure is comparable with Figure 1. The dotted kinked line shows the profit 
curve when the examination of loans is perfect in the second stage. 
 
 Figure 5. Adverse Selection and Profitability 
 
Applicants' Default Rate = 5%  Applicants' Default Rate = 10% 
Applicants' Default Rate = 15%  Applicants' Default Rate = 25% 


















Three Industries 2,000 14 498 2.68 0.92 13.4 0.91
Surviving 1,000 14 482 2.42 1.07 22.9 0.23
Defaulting 1,000 14 504 2.95 0.81 7.7 3.02
   Manufacturing 485 30 702 2.56 1.46 11.4 1.33
Surviving 248 32 725 2.28 2.14 21.0 0.34
Defaulting 237 26 617 2.83 1.09 6.2 4.07
   Wholesale 515 13 812 2.50 0.55 11.8 0.85
Surviving 252 14 760 2.14 0.61 19.6 0.23
Defaulting 263 13 877 2.80 0.53 5.9 2.47
   Construction 1,000 11 338 2.88 0.96 15.2 0.84
Surviving 500 11 308 2.61 1.10 25.7 0.20
Defaulting 500 12 374 3.11 0.91 9.8 2.65 
 
 




Three Industries 57.9 1092 75.8 1235
   Manufacturing 61.3 288 81.0 1155
   Wholesale 66.0 288 81.7 911
   Construction 54.7 460 67.1 1379 
 
 
Table 3. Spearman’s Rank-order Correlation Coefficients 
Defaulting firms 0.24 (0.00) 0.07 (0.04)
   Those in Manufacturing 0.16 (0.01) 0.11 (0.09)
   Those in Wholesale 0.17 (0.01) 0.04 (0.55)
   Those in Construction 0.31 (0.00) 0.05 (0.25)
Surviving firms -0.01 (0.84) 0.21 (0.00)
Debt Ratios Sales Ratios
 
Notes: Numbers in the brackets are the p-values (Null hypothesis is the 
correlation coefficient equals 0). 
 